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statutes27 which are designed to protect this information as though it
were the personal asset of the party. In the sense that Sawyer protects
the party's right of privacy, it is consistent with the Oklahoma view;
but Oklahoma, in rejecting the theory of settlement, has adopted limita-
tions on discovering a party's ability to pay which are far more restric-
tive than those of New Hampshire. In view of the restrictive language
in Carman, it seems likely that if the question of discovering the de-
fendant's financial situation in a tort action for wrongful death or injury
arose, the Oklahoma court would follow the lead of Sawyer in refusing
discovery of the party's personal assets and would continue to deny dis-
covery of any liability insurance.
Kenneth L. Brune
EVIDENCE-ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE-MATTERS RELATING
TO RECEIPT OF FEES FROM A CLIENT ARE NOT USUALLY PRIV-
ILEDGED. United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir.
1974).
Pursuant to an investigation of the federal income tax liability of
A, a known gambling suspect, an Internal Revenue Service summons
was issued and served upon Paul Hodgson, an attorney, requiring him
to produce certain records related to his employment by A.1 Hodgson
appeared before an IRS special agent at the time and place specified
by the summons but declined to produce the requested records or to
testify, on the presumption that such acts would be a violation of the
attorney-client relationship. Hodgson also based his refusal upon the
27. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1657 (1971). OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 2-111 (1971).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 10-115 (1971).
1. United States v. Hodgson, No. 73-C-24 at 3 (N.D. Okla. 1973). Respondent,
Hodgson, was directed to bring with him the following documents:
1) Records of all charges to or in behalf of [A] during the years 1966
through 1971, inclusive, for legal fees, advice and/or other services.
2) Records of all moneys received and/or amounts credited by you for or in
the behalf of [A] for legal fees, advice and/or other services rendered
during 1966 through 1971, inclusive. This includes, but is not limited to:
a. Amounts
b. Dates of Payment
c. By whom paid or who caused the credit to be made
d. How the payments or credits were made, i.e., check, currency or other,
[Vol. I0
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fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, claiming that the
requested information might tend to incriminate his client.
In an opinion by Judge Breitenstein, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court order that denied
the judicial enforcement of the summons. 2 The appellate court dis-
missed the fifth amendment claim3 and focused its attention upon the
question of whether the attorney-client privilege extended to the rec-
ords and information sought from Hodgson. After consideration of the
issue, the court concluded that matters relating to receipt of fees from
a client are not usually privileged.4
One of the decisive factors in the adjudication of the case was
whether the guidelines for the recognition of information deemed
within the privilege are to be governed by state or federal law. Hodg-
son's basic premise in both district and appellate court was that state
law should be followed by the federal courts.5 Relying upon this pre-
sumption, Hodgson based his defense upon a Mississippi case wherein
the court, interpreting a state statute similar to Oklahoma's privilege
statute,6 held that certain matters, including records of dates and
amounts paid by the client to the attorney, are privileged. 7  However,
the court of appeals in Hodgson ruled that in the area of federal income
2. United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1974).
3. The court based its holding upon Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336
(1973); see also United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 n.1 (8th Cir. 1972); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.
1961). Contra, United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
4. United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 1974); accord,
United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Semel, 411 F.2d 195,
197 (3d Cir. 1969); Wirtz v. Fowler, 372 F.2d 315, 332 (5th Cir. 1966); N.L.R.B. v.
Harvey, 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2d
Cir. 1962); In re Wasserman, 198 F. Supp. 564, 566 (D.D.C. 1961); United States v.
Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 349 (M.D. Penn. 1973). But see Tillotson v. Boughner, 350
F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965).
5. In support of this premise, Hodgson cited 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 190 n.96
(1960). However, the text from which the footnote was drawn recites in toto, "While
it has been held that state law governs as to the admissibility of evidence in a diversity
case, it has also been held that the matter is governed by federal law, and that in a
proper case evidence which is incompetent under state law may be received." See
United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623
(9th Cir. 1960).
6. OLA. STAT. tit 5, § 3 states in pertinent part: "It is the duty of the attorney
and counselor . . . tlo maintain inviolate the confidence, and, at any peril to himself,
to preserve the secrets of his client."
7. United States v. Ladner, 238 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Miss. 1965). It should be
noted that Mississippi is in the Fifth Circuit and in light of the following appellate court
opinions Ladner is probably no longer good law in Mississippi: United States v. Ponder,
475 F.2d 37 (5th Cir, 1973); United States v, Finley, 434 F,2d 596 (5th Cir. 1970).
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tax investigation, the question of privilege is a matter of federal, not
state law."
Assuming that the Tenth Circuit's decision as to applicable law
represents the majority opinion of the eleven circuits and likewise their
decision concerning the status of fees paid by the client, the legal pro-
fession remains confronted with the question of the effect of this and
other similar rulings upon the individual attorney. In the face of a
summons to discover the amount of fees paid, by whom paid, and for
what services, does the lawyer still have an ethical obligation to his cli-
ent to challenge the summons even though the weight of authority
would seem to indicate that the court will ultimately compel disclosure?
Absent any definitive ruling by the Standing Committee on Professional
Ethics of the American Bar Association, the answer to this question
must be yes, such a duty still exists.
In all of the cases dealing with this matter of fees and privilege,
not one of the courts has asserted that fee-related information is abso-
lutely outside of the privilege.9 Their decisions in this regard are gen-
erally stated in terms that such matters, i.e. receipt of fees, are usually
or normally not within the privilege. While it may be argued that this
is but a matter of semantics, one should consider whether just such a
qualification might not be sufficient to render an attorney liable to his
client. It is important to note that in the district court hearing of Hodg-
son, Judge Allen E. Barrow stated: "The court further finds that the
Respondent might subject himself to a law suit if he submitted the in-
formation and testimony in compliance with the summons and failed
to assert the attorney-client privilege."' 0 The court of appeals likewise
commented upon the lawyer's duty to call such a matter to the attention
of the court, raising the privilege "as to each record sought and each
question asked so that at the enforcement hearing the court can rule
with specificity."" It would thus appear that while the courts have fol-
lowed a general pattern of denying privileged status to financial trans-
actions between the attorney and his client, they have been unwilling
to adopt a blanket rule to this same end.
8. United States v. Finley, 434 F.2d 596, 597 (5th Cir. 1970); Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital,
209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954). Contra, Baird v.
Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).,
9. Cases cited note 4 supra.
10. United States v. Hodgson, No. 73-C-24 at 5 (N.D. Okla. 1973); see In re Was.
serman, 198 F. Supp. 564, 566 (D.D.C. 1961), noted in 13 MERcER L. REv. 434 (1962).
11, United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir, 1974).
[Vol. 10
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The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics has thus far failed to provide an adequate guide as to the
course an attorney should take when confronted with a situation such
as that posed in Hodgson. The question of whether the amount of fee
paid by a client is privileged was first posed in the Committee's Infor-
mal Opinion No. 311, but no answer was given. 12 Informal Opinions
Nos. 39313 and 111014 are both addressed to the question of compelled
disclosure of fees paid by clients; however, each defers the matter to
Formal Opinion No. 247 wherein it is stated that whether certain infor-
mation is privileged is a question of law and not of ethics. 5 For this
reason, the Committee stated that it would not attempt to decide the
issue. This attitude might perhaps alleviate the concern of the attorney
affected, in that he could rely upon the precedent in his own jurisdic-
tion, were it not for a singular statement included in Informal Opinion
No. 795:
The Committee is of the opinion that dealings between a law-
yer and his client concerning the pecuniary considerations
(or lack thereof) for the performance of the legal services,
is included within the client's confidences which the lawyer
must preserve. 16
Despite the seeming clarity and finality of this statement, there
still exists an ambiguity created by the factual patterns involved. In-
formal Opinion No. 393 dealt with a factual situation directly in point
with that of Hodgson. Informal Opinion No. 795 concerned a situation
wherein a lawyer, running for public office, wished to include in his
political advertising the fact that he had performed free legal services
for various people and organizations, the specific names of which were
to be listed. The principle involved in each case would appear to be
the same; yet, differing results were reached. The sequence of publi-
cation might arguably suggest that Informal Opinion No. 795, being the
more recent of the two opinions, supersedes Informal Opinion No. 393.
However, in 1969, four years after the publication of Informal Opin-
ion No. 795, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics issued Infor-
mal Opinion No. 1110, reaffirming its position as stated in Informal
Opinion No. 393. Therein lies the ambiguity. Was Informal Opinion
12. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 311 (1952).
13. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 393 (1961)
(factual pattern in point with that in Hodgson).
14. ABA CoMm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIC:, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 110 (1969).
15. ABA CoMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 247 (1942).
16. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 795 (1965).
1974]
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No. 795 meant to be a broad policy statement or to be confined to the
specific facts involved? Caution should dictate that the attorney follow
the more conservative interpretation and govern his actions in accord-
ance with the policy of Informal Opinion No. 795. Under such circum-
stance, the attorney has no alternative but to challenge a summons re-
questing financial records on the basis of the attorney-client privilege.17
The effect of the Hodgson decision should therefore serve primar-
ily as an indicator of the manner in which the federal courts are inclined
to treat matters relating to fees paid by clients. While this type of in-
formation is not deemed to be a confidential communication such as
to afford it privileged status within the federal judiciary system, it none-
theless remains a potential confidence or secret as defined and pro-
tected within the Code of Professional Responsibility. Until such time
as the issue is brought before a competent court of law and disclosure
is ordered therein, the attorney is under a strict duty to preserve this
information from outside discovery. When served with summons, such
as the one involved in the instant case, the attorney may owe his client
the courtesy of advising him as to the probability of the court's compel-
ling disclosure. When called before the court, the attorney has the
duty to raise the issue of attorney-client privilege as to each record
sought and question asked and thereupon to challenge the validity of
the summons.' 8  Having done this, the attorney has fulfilled his obliga-
17. While this is the conclusion that must be reached from the opinions dealing spe-
cifically with fees, there would seem to be no reason prohibiting the Committee from
using the same rationale with regard to fees as they used with the identity and address
of a client in Informal Opinion No. 1188 (reaffirmed in Informal Opinion No. 1200).
Though the opinion specifically concerned the revealing of names and addresses, the
principle underlying the opinion is broad enough to extend to other situations which
would produce similar results. These are situations in which the contested information,
innocuous under normal circumstances, would, due to unique factors of the case, tend
to prove a fact such as guilt or liability. The Committee stated that whether certain
information is "secret" within the meaning of Canon Four and Disciplinary Rule No.
4-104 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is an issue of fact, not law, the final
determination of which is governed by the response to three basic questions.
(a) Will the disclosure of the client's name (or address) likely be detrimental
to the client?
(b) Will such disclosure be embarrassing to the client?
(c) Did the client request that his name (or address) not be disclosed?
If any of these three questions are answered in the affirmative, the information is secret
and protected by DR 4-104(B). If the term "fees" is substituted for "name (or ad-
dress)" in the above test, a subsequent affirmative response will likewise indicate that
this information comes within the protection of DR 4-104(B).
18. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971); Reisman v. Caplin, 375
U.S. 440 (1964); United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1970). The Donaldson case establishes the
two requirements for a valid summons as: (1) Issued in good faith; and (2) Issued prior
to a recommendation for a criminal prosecution. Billingsley interpretes "recommenda-
5
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